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SECOND THOUGHTS: HOW HUMAN
CLONING CAN PROMOTE HUMAN DIGNITY
R. George Wright*
We decant our babies as socialized human beings,
as Alphas and Epsilons ....
Aldous Huxley**
Are you, then, so easily turned from your design?
Did you not call this a glorious expedition?
Mary Shelley ' *
This may be called the cunning of Reason ....
G.W.F. Hegel****
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the announcement of the cloning of a sheep prompted a
number of distinctly negative responses. These responses ranged from
the emotional and intuitive to the highly technical and carefully
articulated. Given the potentially large moral and legal stakes, it is
important to think as best we can about the various possible future kinds
of human cloning, and about possible justifications for and possible legal
regulatory limits on such cloning. If we postpone our best thinking
about human cloning until it is actually feasible, technological
imperatives and market demand may render much of our thinking
practically irrelevant.
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The most common objection to human cloning sees some or all
such cloning as somehow incompatible with human dignity. This
objection of course presupposes some understanding of the idea of
human dignity. An account of human dignity in the context of human
cloning is, as we shall see below, extremely important. Our ultimate
attitude toward human cloning and its legal regulation will crucially
depend on our understanding of the idea of human dignity.
To briefly anticipate our conclusion, the dignitary and related
objections to many sorts of human cloning are misplaced. Remarkably,
these objections turn out to be backward and even unintentionally
perverse. For reasons developed below, the unanticipated, ironic
consequence of mainstream forms of human cloning is instead likely to
be the clarification and highlighting of the actual nature and grounds of
human dignity. Whatever the expectations of either its supporters or its
critics, the typical forms of human cloning are in the long run likely to
actually deepen and enhance our appreciation of human dignity.
II. DIGNITARY OBJECTIONS TO HUMAN CLONING
A. Some Initial Considerations
If we are in any sense unprepared for human cloning, our lack of
preparedness may be reflected in the quality of our collective moral and
legal discussion. We may begin, and perhaps even unfortunately end,
our ethical debate with merely emotive reactions,1 with a benchmark
standard of becoming morally "comfortable with a situation,"2 or with
*Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.**ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 13 (First Perennial Classics ed., 1998) (1932).
***MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 197 (1991) (1818).
-*GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY 43-44 (Robert S. Hartman trans.
1953) (1837) (italics in the original).
1 "'Offensive.! 'Grotesque.' 'Revolting.' 'Repugnant.' 'Repulsive.' These are the words
most commonly heard regarding the prospect of human cloning." Leon R Kass, The
Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679,
686(1998).
2 See generally Michael J. Reiss, What Sort of People Do We Want? The Ethics of Changing
People Through Genetic Engineering, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 63, 82 (1999)
(citing the theologian Ian Barbour on delaying human germ-line therapy not only for safety
testing, but to allow sufficient time to elapse so that persons may become 'comfortable'
with the idea). Of course, the dividing line between increasing "comfort" over time and
sheer "desensitization" to human cloning may not always be clear.
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merely conventionalist moral standards.3 We may well have difficulty
in attributing the proper moral weight to the intended consequences, the
foreseeable consequences, and the unforeseen consequences of our
decisions on human cloning.4 Unanticipated or long-term consequences
of human cloning policies may of course be either good or bad, and
either important or unimportant, but such unanticipated consequences
may become recognizable to us only after it is too late to do much about
them.5 And even some critics of human cloning suspect that for broad
cultural and technological reasons, debate may already be largely
pointless, in that human cloning may, realistically, simply be inevitable. 6
There may seem little point in debating the desirability of that which is
inescapable.
Ethical and legal discussion of human cloning may, for these
reasons, turn out to be either unimpressive in quality or in some respects
futile. But we can, at least within limits, still have some control over the
quality of the debate. And even if some forms of human cloning are
practically inevitable, at least some of the most nightmarish abuses of
human cloning technology may still be subject to reasonably effective
legal regulation, either at the national or international level.
The language of the moral and legal debate over human cloning,
especially from the standpoint of many opponents of human cloning,
3 See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 609,632-33
(1999) (focusing on conventional understandings of family, parenting, kinship, and
procreative freedom).
4 See, e.g., John Robinson, Why an Acceptable Cloning Policy Will Be Hard to Achieve, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 12 (1999) (referring specifically to "how resistant
modem scientific thought has been to efforts to distinguish intended effects from those that
are merely foreseen").
5 For case studies of unanticipated consequences in other contexts, see, e.g., Paul J.
Culhane, NEPA's Im pact on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 20 ENVTL. L. 681
(1990); LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
6 See, e.g., George J. Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice or An Echo, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 247,
260 (1998) (medical invention as the mother of necessity); Lisa Sowle Cahill, No Hunnan
Cloning: A Social Ethics Perspective, 27 HOSTRA L. REV. 487, 495 (1999) (citing Daniel
Callahan and Lori Andrews); Editorial: Don't Clone People, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2000, at
A20. For a much broader argument, see JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 99
John Wilkinson trans., 1970) (1954)(" [Elverything which is technique is necessarily used as
soon as it is available, without distinction of good or evil. This is the principal law of our
age.. . 'Since it was possible, it was necessary.' Really a master phrase for all technical
evolution.").
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commonly focuses on human dignity. This focus on human dignity is
characteristic of private citizens and scholars,7 religious officials and
organizations, 8 international organizations 9 as well as governments at
7 See, e.g., Ted Peters, Cloning Shock: A Theological Reaction, in HUMAI4 CLONING:
RELIGIOUS RESPONSES 12, 21 (Ronald Cole-Turner ed., 1997) (discussing how economic
forces tending to commodify children, thereby raising dignitary concerns, are potentially
aided by human cloning); Marciano Vidal, Cloning: Technical Reality and Ethical Evaluation,
in THE ETHics OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 102, 109 (Maureen Junker-Kenny & Lisa Sowle
Cahill eds., 1998) (examining human cloning as inescapably treating humans as objects,
contrary to human dignity); Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional
Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 666 (1998) (finding cloning
as "a challenge to human dignity"); Annas, supra note 6, at 273 (analyzing the threat of
humans as designed products, "undermining the uniqueness on... which human dignity
is based"); Kass, supra note 1, at 705 (comparing both human artifactuality and slavery to"unregulated progress" to wisdom, prudence, freedom, and "human dignity"); M.
Cathleen Kaveny, Cloning and Positive Liberty, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 15,
27-28 (1999) (expressing a concern for "fundamental dignity"); Sophia Kolehmainen,
Human Cloning: Brave New Mistake, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557 (1999); Gilbert Meilaender,
Cloning in Protestant Perspective, 32 VAL U. L REv. 707, 711 (1998) (expressing "human
begetting" as "our equal dignity"); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning,
76 TEX. L REV. 1371, 1410 (1998) ("(T]he initial reaction to human cloning, particularly in
Europe, was that it was a violation of human dignity and identity."); Note, Human Cloning
and Substantive Due Process, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2350 (1998) ("A common objection is
that human cloning poses a serious threat to human dignity."); Jorge Garcia, Who's Afraid of
Human Cloning?, FIRST TIuNGS, Mar. 1999, at 54-56 (book review) (discussing the threat to
"human uniqueness and dignity" of the design and manufacture of human persons).
8 See, e.g., Sr. Teresa Auer, OSF, Cloning: A Catholic Moral Evaluation (Dec. 11, 1999)
available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/PROLIFE/CLONING.TXT (viewing human
cloning as "immoral because it opposes the dignity both of human procreation and of the
conjugal union"); Congregation For the Doctrine of the Faith, Respect For Human Life (Feb.
22, 1987) available at http://www.cin.org/vatcong/donumuit.html (stating that human
cloning is "in opposition to the dignity both of human procreation and of the conjugal
union"); Pontifical Academy For Life, Reflections on Human Cloning (Dec. 11, 1999) available
at http://www.ewtn.com/library/PROLIFE/CLONING.HTM ("[Iuman cloning must
also be judged negative [sic] with regard to the dignity of the person cloned ... ").
9 See, e.g., Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning Humnan Beings, ETS no. 168 (Dec. 1,
1998)(prohibiting "any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to
another human being, whether living or dead"); Cloning in Human Health, Report by the
Secretariat, World Health Organization, 52d World Health Assembly, U.N. Doc. A52/12
(1999) ("'[Ciloning for the replication of human individuals is ethically unacceptable and
contrary to human dignity and integrity'."); Council of Europe, Convention For the
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, ETS
no. 164 (April 4, 1997); Opinion of the CDBI on Human Cloning, Steering Committee on
Bioethics, Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe (1997), available at
http://www.coe.fr/cm/reports/cmdocs/1997/97cmlll.html ("[Tlhe instrumentalisation of
human beings through the deliberate creation of genetically identical human beings is
contrary to human dignity and thus constitutes a misuse of medicine and biology.");
Records of the General Conference, U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
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various levels, including foreign governments,1 0 the American federal
government,11 and even American state governments. 12 Questions of
human dignity will take center stage for us as well.
B. Dignity, Privacy, and Autonomy
The objection to human cloning based on human dignity has
been elaborated in a number of ways and with reference to a number of
ideas. The idea of human dignity in the context of human cloning is in
some cases, for example, linked to the idea of privacy. Would it violate
the privacy of the cloning "recipient" if we knew, or even thought we
knew, the fairly precise genetic limitations and capacities of that cloning
recipient in light of our knowledge of the genetic life already led by the
cloning "donor?" 13 Could the sheer multiplicity of numerous clones
similar in appearance, or just the erosion of individuality inherent in
29th Sess., at 44 (1998) ("Practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as
reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted."). See also Melissa K.
Cantrell, International Response to Dolly: Will Scientific Freedom Get Sheared?, 13 J.L &
HEALTH 69 (1998-99). The reference to 'Dolly' is of course a reference to the sheep cloned in
1997 by Ian Wilmut's team. See Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offring Derived From Fetal and
Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 NATURE 810 (1997).
10 See, e.g., Japanese Expert Panel Urges Ban On Human Cloning, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
July 29,1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2645989 ("[Tlhe government should take heed of the
concerns, felt by a majority of Japanese people, over human cloning" . . . "[in addition to
human cloning, we strongly opposed creating a living thing out of human and animal cells
.... Such practices must be banned absolutely.").
" For a summary overview of some of the early developments and machinations at the
federal level, see Heidi Forster & Emily Ramsey, Legal Responses to the Potential Cloning of
Human Beings, 32 VAL U. L. REV. 433, 435-36 (1998). Much of the ethical impetus behind
American legal regulatory efforts is attributable to a National Bioethics Advisory
Commission report submitted in response to a request by President Clinton. See NATIONAL
BIOETHIcs ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 49-51 (1997)
[hereinafter CLONING HUMAN BEINGS]. Concern for human dignity is central to this report.
See id. at 49-51 ("To treat persons who are ... created through cloning as mere objects,
means or instruments violates the religious principle of human dignity as well as the
secular principle of respect for persons."). For federal regulatory developments, see
generally Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning: Is the Reach of FDA Authority Too Far a
Stretch?, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 464 (2000).
12 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2260.5 (West 2000) (prohibiting human cloning as
unprofessional medical conduct until January 1, 2003); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24185 (West 2000) (stating that "[n]o person shall clone a human being" and offering a
quite typically problematic definition of 'clone').
13 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 7, at 657.
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human cloning, threaten privacy and dignity?1 4 On the other hand,
couldn't the actual practice of some forms of human cloning actually
involve less intrusion into the family from outsiders than other forms of
assisted reproduction? 1 5 In such a case, cloning could actually turn out
to be a relatively privacy protective, as opposed to privacy invasive,
reproductive technique. 1 6
Dignity-based objections to human cloning are also sometimes
linked to violations of human autonomy. Admittedly, in some cases
there may be possible tradeoffs between dignity and autonomy, 1 7 even
though respect for autonomy is most often conducive to human
dignity.1 8 It has certainly been suggested that there may be some
linkages between lack of autonomy and lack of dignity in the context of
human cloning. For example, Professor Cathleen Kaveny raises the
possibility that cloning may undermine "the conditions for autonomy" 19
of the child, somehow undermining the child's mental capacities, given
the child's knowledge that she in some sense has only one genetic
parent2 0 instead of the customary two. Kaveny is concerned as well for
the resulting child's sense of an open future, given the possible effects of
14 See id.
15 See David Orentlicher, Cloning and the Preservation of Family Integrity, 59 LA. L. REV. 1019
(1999) (arguing this basic proposition).
16 See id.
17 See generally R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Hiunan
Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397 (1995).
18 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975).
19 Kaveny, supra note 7, at 29.
20 Even if we ignore the sense in which everyone, clone or not, is the genetic product of
many different persons, it may be hasty to suppose that all common human cloning
techniques will involve significant genetic contributions from only one person. Doubtless
advancing technology will open up a wider range of possibilities, some more traditionalist
than others. It also seems possible that a child resulting from, say, the genetic material in a
father's nuclear cell material and a mother's mitochondrial genetic material residing
outside the nucleus of the original clone cell may be genetically affected, to some as yet
unknown degree, by the mitochondrial genetic material not attributable to the father. This
scenario also sets aside the various other genetic, biological, intrauterine, and (other)
environmental influences on the child. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 15, at 1019 n.1;
Michael H. Shapiro, The linpact of Genetic Enhancement on Equality, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
561, 567 r19 (1999) ("The genome only provides the blueprint for formation of the brain;
the finer details of assembly and intellectual development are beyond direct genetic control
and must perforce be subject to innumerable stochastic and environmental influences.")
(quoting Jon W. Gordon, Genetic Enhancement in Humans, 283 Sc. 2023-24 (1999)).
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cloning on the child's sense of unmanipulated independence and the
child's "sense of dignity." 2 1
Professor Philip Kitcher makes a related cautionary argument:
If cloning a human being is undertaken in the hope of
generating a...person whose standards of what matters
in life are imposed from without, then it is morally
repugnant, not because it involves biological tinkering,
but because it is continuous with other ways of
interfering with human autonomy that we ought to
resist.22
It has also been argued that cloning may give one a sense of a
closed, predetermined, non-individualized identity, undermining one's
sense of privacy and autonomy, whether others know one to be a clone
or not.2 3 Certainly, all of these autonomy-related arguments deserve to
be taken with appropriate seriousness.
But most forms of human cloning need not be locked into any
special conflict with human autonomy. We will discuss autonomy and
dignity in a distinctly Kantian sense below. 24 But even an initial
common sense analysis suggests the long-term compatibility of
autonomy, in its ordinary senses and usages, with most forms of human
cloning. Certainly no consideration remotely sufficient to justify a
general ban of human cloning emerges.
Initially, there may well be many cloners who will naively
expect a clone to display all the distinctive and valued attributes of their
nuclear progenitor, especially if the clone is also trained or educated
constantly along the desired lines. The cloner may believe himself to
have fairly paid for a supposedly unbeatable combination of heredity
and environment. If one has paid good money for a somatic cell of
Michael Jordan, one is hardly inclined to accept a resulting mediocre
21 Kaveny, supra note 7, at 29.
22 PHILIP KITCHER, THE UvES TO COME: THE GENETIC REVOLUrION AND HUMAN
POSSIBILITIES 335 (1996).
23 See Andrews, supra note 7, at 657.
24 See infra Part V.
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basketball-playing clone. 2 5 Buyers may be in no mood to hear about the
limits of heredity or of the fallacies of biological determinism. Perhaps
one might even bitterly argue for an implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose.2 6
Of course, if there are dozens or hundreds of authorized or
bootlegged Michael Jordan clones, all, let us miraculously assume, with
the athletic skills and competitive determination of the original, that by
itself might well tend to drive down the market value of exhibiting
precisely those skills.2 7 But we may predict disappointment among
buyers even if the most basic laws of supply and demand were to
somehow be repealed. Genetics, or at least cellular nuclear material, is
not destiny. 2 8 Nor is destiny even a matter of genetics reinforced by
incessant parental browbeating. No parent, for example, can control the
clone's broader historical and cultural environment. A clone of Adam
Sandler might not be considered riotously hilarious in all possible
worlds. We can even imagine circumstances in which a second
Beethoven or a second Einstein would not reach iconic status, due to
changes in public taste, or a change in the basic nature of the physics
problems of the day.2 9 Is a clone of Gandhi at all likely to become a
saintly inspiration to millions?
In fact, we may suspect that as "parental" expectations of the
clone's flourishing in some predetermined way increase, some clones
might tend all the more to resist those imposed expectations in one way
or another, in extreme cases by self-sabotage or indifference, in other
cases simply by insisting on one's own chosen path. Why should we
25 It would seem irrelevant to this point whether one obtains the somatic cell with the
'donor's' consent or not.
26 See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1998) (requiring an implied warranty where the seller has reason to
know of buyer's particular purpose and the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment).
27 See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Carman ed., Modem Library 1994) (1776).
28 See Orentlicher, supra note 15, at 1022,1026.
29 Some physics problems can be visually represented or verbally stated in a
comprehensible way; others cannot. See, e.g., RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, ET AL., THE FEYNMAN
LECTURES ON PHYSICS 2-6, 2-7 (1963). Einstein himself, though a major early contributor to
the very birth of quantum theory, was never entirely a comfortable adherent of the theory
at the deepest level. See, e.g., Max Jammer, The EPR Problem in its Historical Development, in
SYMPOSIUM ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICS 129 (Pekka Lahti & Peter
Mittelstaedt eds., 1985).
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expect most clones to be exempt from all impulses of rebellion and
defiance?
This is simply a matter of human experience, clone or not. Even
the most thoughtfully selected and bred clone cannot come with a
warranty. And it seems quite likely that human cloners will eventually
realize this fact. Human autonomy will win out. The limitations of
typical forms of human cloning as a way of generating pliant,
cooperative tailored products will eventually pass into folk wisdom, and
cloner expectations will generally be adjusted accordingly. 30 At that
point, typically futile attempts to create and steer clones toward specific
preselected goals may even diminish. Even the cloners may then come
to admit the power of human autonomy.
Human cloning has also been opposed in other related, if vaguer
terms. Ideas such as that of 'mystery,' 31 the violation of 'sanctity,' 32
'untouchability,' 33 and 'desacralization' 4 have been deployed in
opposition to human cloning. It is admittedly true that the vaguer the
idea, the more difficult it is to know precisely how human cloning would
affect it. But there is again no reason to simply assume that human
cloning would eventually prove disastrous in some subtle but profound
way. Let us suppose that human cloning somehow undermines or
exposes some sort of mystery. Why should we place great value on any
mystery that can be exposed merely through the process of human
cloning? What is the value of a mystery that can be preserved only if we
30 Cloning one's self, a relative, or a merely genetically healthy, culturally consensually
beautiful, handsome, or tall person may come to be popular. Cloning merely for particular
traits, such as eye color, may be more predictably manageable, but in their sheer
unambitiousness pose no serious threat to the clone's autonomy. Cloning oneself or a
relative simply as an open-ended experiment, out of curiosity, also does not threaten
autonomy. To the extent that one clones oneself or a relative with the expectation that the
resulting clone will have talents or a personality like the clone's progenitor, one will again
be subject to disappointment, even if one attempts to raise the clone child in a coercively
narrow, directed way.
31 See, e.g., Meilaender, supra note 7, at 709 (stating that the human cloning possibility
"aims directly at the heart of the mystery that is a child").
32 See, e.g., CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 11, at 49.
33 See, e.g., Statement of Lisa Sowle Cahill, in Religion-Based Perspectives on Cloning of
Humans: Testimony Before National Bioethics Advisory Commission, in 14 ETHICS &
MEDICINE 8, 12 (1998).
34 BERNARD E. ROLLIN, THE FRANKENSTEIN SYNDROME: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE
GENETIC ENGINEERING OF ANIMALS 24 (1995) (raising and discussing the possibility of the
desacralization of life through reductionism and manipulativeness of genetic engineering).
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decide to refrain from the technique of human cloning? Wouldn't a
mystery of real value be a bit more durable, impenetrable, and
profoufid?
There is admittedly a difference between explaining an apparent
mystery and treating something profound with lack of respect. Treating
a person contemptuously, for example, does not liberate us from some
obscure and mysterious superstition. Contempt has no such favorable
consequences. But as we shall see below,35 human cloning in general,
quite apart from anyone's intentions, may well actually turn out to
enhance the deeper, more genuine mysteries upon which human dignity
itself is genuinely based.
C. Cloning and Commodification
The dignitary objection to human cloning, however, can be
stated a bit less mysteriously and a bit more concretely. In a culture
preoccupied with commercial consumption,36 it is certainly imaginable
that human cloning will amount to a further step in the gradual overall
commodification of life itself. A number of writers have expressed
something like this fear of commodification. 3 7 More broadly, critics of
35 See infra Part VI.
36 See, e.g., STUART EWEN & ELIZABETH EWEN, CHANNELS OF DESIRE: MASS IMAGES AND
THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS (1982); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE
UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY (1984); THE CULTURE OF
CONSUMPTION: CRrIICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980 (Richard Wightman Fox
& T.J. Jackson Lears eds., 1983); R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A
COMMERCIAL CULTURE ch. 6 (1997); Pierre Schlag, This Could Be Your Culture - Junk Speech
In a Time of Decadence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1801 (1996) (reviewing RONALD K.L. COLLINS &
DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (1996)).
37 See, e.g., Jan C. Heller, Religiously Based Objections to Human Cloning: Are They
Sustainable?, in HUMAN CLONING 153, 169 (1997) (referring to "the concerns expressed for
the potential to objectify and commodify the products of cloning"); Peters, supra note 7, at
21 (expressing a dignitary concern "based on the potential for cloning, along with other
genetic technologies, to play into the hands of economic forces that will tend to commodify
children"); Andrews, supra note 7, at 656-57; R. Alta Charo, Cloning: Ethics and Public Policy,
27 HOFsRA L. REV. 503, 506 (1999) (referring to the argument that cloning "would
encourage a kind of commercialization, or, at least, commodification, of children"); Elliot
N. Dorff, Human Cloning: A Jewish Perspective, 8 S. CAL INTERDISC. L.J. 117, 118 (1998)
("Even if we set aside the issue of who would be cloned, the very process of cloning
commodities human life."); Kass, supra note 1, at 697 ("[Tihe violation of human equality,
freedom, and dignity are present even in a single planned clone. And procreation
dehumanized into manufacture is further degraded by commodification, a virtually
inescapable result of allowing baby-making to proceed under the banner of commerce.");
Leon R. Kass, The Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1999, at 32, 35
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human cloning are concerned that human reproduction will eventually
be reduced 38 to the mere production 39 of objects. 40 Human life itself
(referring to genetic engineering developments in general, along with "the powerful
economic interests that will surely operate in this area; with their advent, the
commodification of nascent human life will be unstoppable"); Kolehmainen, supra note 7,
at 561.
It has also been argued that there is a difference between reproductive technology that
merely meets already existing needs and other forms of reproductive technology, including
human cloning, that create new needs. See LORi B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE:
ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 256 (1999) [hereinafter
ADVENTURES]. The broad distinction between meeting preexisting needs and creating and
then fulfilling new or artificial needs has been developed elsewhere. See, e.g., JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958). The problem with this distinction,
though, generally and in the specific area of reproductive technology, is its lack of clarity.
There seems at first glance to be some needs that are entirely natural, and other needs that
are artificially induced. To induce a need and then fulfill that need seems akin to
unproductively digging holes simply to fill them up again.
But can needs really be separated into the natural and the artificial? Don't most needs
really partake to some degree of both? Don't most needs, even the most apparently
artificial, have some basis in a widely shared, if not universal, drive or desire? And isn't
the form or more precise character in which almost all needs are fulfilled largely an
artificial, contingent cultural artifact? Eating a fast-food hamburger is not merely a primal,
visceral fufillment of the need to avoid starvation, but it has some such physiological basis
apart from the many commercials that may have artificially steered us toward one chain or
another. In some sense, after all, even cooking the hamburger is artificial; lions do not
bother with cooking.
We may similarly conclude that human cloning has both relatively natural and
relatively artificial, cultivated elements. Reproduction, and particularly reproducing one's
own genetic line, may have basic biological roots. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH
GENE (1990). In this sense, cloning is deeply natural. Doubtless, on the other hand, human
cloning is also highly artificial, in that humanity has progressed over virtually all of its
historic journey without human cloning as a realistic option. Still, one could argue that
cloning is in a sense more natural in its appeal than some long familiar consumer goods.
An attempted distinction between in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood, on the
one hand, as natural, and cloning, on the other hand, as an artificially induced need seems
similarly doubtful. See ADVENTURES, supra note 37, at 256.
38 See, e.g., Abigail Rian Evans, Saying No to Human Cloning, in HUMAN CLONING:
RELIGIOUS RESPONSES 25 (Ronald Cole-Turner ed., 1997) (objecting to human cloning on
grounds, among others, that "it fosters a reductionistic rather than a holistic view of human
nature"). See also Shapiro, supra note 20, at 564 (referring more broadly to the problem of
technologically-based reductionism).
39 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 7, at 23 ("Reproduction will come to look more and more like
production. Babies will come to look more and more like products.").
40 See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Cloning Hunan Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and
Cot, in CLONES AND CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 141, 159
(Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998) (referring merely to the possibility
that a cloned child might come "to be objectified, valued only as an object and for its
genome, or at least for its genome's expected phenotypic expression, and no longer
recognized as having the intrinsic equal moral value of all persons, simply as persons");
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 11, at 50; Heller, supra note 37, at 169 (referring to
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would become, and be perceived as, merely a sophisticated
manufactured 41 product, and the human person reduced to complex
machinery.4 2
These concerns are well taken, in the sense that the broad
processes of commodification 4 3 and starkly reductionist views of the
human culture4 4 have already long been underway. And it is fair to say
that the commodification of life, along with overly reductionist views of
life and culture, do not bode well for the deep respect of human dignity
in the future. There is ultimately no reason to accord genuine respect to
mere commodities, or to mere mechanical objects, however complex or
high their market price. Commodities generally do not possess dignity
in the sense classically ascribed to humans or to rational persons. Nor is
it at all clear why humans would really possess dignity in this sense if
being human were thus reducible. We can certainly admire the
sophistication of a piece of computer hardware or of a software program.
But we do not ascribe genuine dignity to either, or even to their
combination.
The idea of respect for human dignity is thus certainly
jeopardized by commodification, and by any form of reductionism of the
person. But these are very broad processes. From the fact that broad
commodification and reductionism in general imperil human dignity, we
cannot infer that all popular forms of the much more specific
phenomenon of human cloning will also jeopardize human dignity. This
.concerns expressed for the potential to objectify ... the products of cloning"); Vidal, supra
note 7, at 109 (seeing as a "counter-indication" of human cloning that "human beings have
the dignity of persons and cannot be reduced to 'objects'; the cloning process involves so
many interventions, and of such a nature, that it is impossible for it not to treat human
reality as an 'object"').
41 See, e.g., the contribution of Leon R. Kass in LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE
ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 87-88 (1998) ("A society that allows cloning has, whether it
knows it or not, tacitly said yes to converting procreation into manufacture and to treating
our children as pure projects of our will."); Kolehmainen, supra note 7, at 561; Garcia, supra
note 7, at 56 ("When children are manufactured to designer specifications, they and we are
all debased and endangered.").
42 In the context of embryonic cloning experimentation, see Pontifical Academy For Life,
supra note 8, at 4.
43 See supra note 36.
44 See generally, the behaviourist reductionism in B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND
DIGNITY (1971), the sociobiological emphasis in EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE
(1978), and the combination of biology, chemistry, and computer modeling in DANIEL C.
DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991).
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simply does not follow. By way of analogy, we might grant that
Napoleon's army threatens Moscow, but still insist that some particular
unit of Napoleon's army does not threaten Moscow. This is even clearer
if we recognize, by analogy, that army units crucially differ. Some units
are less effective in carrying out their intentions than others. Some may
even have a sort of "negative" net effectiveness. 45  They may
unintentionally benefit the opposition more than their own formal allies.
We shall see how this characterization actually fits the typical forms of
the phenomenon of human cloning in relationship to human dignity.
D. Cloning, Individuality, and Identity
Surely, though, there are some sorts of interrelationships among
cloning, dignity, and concepts such as individuality, 4 6 uniqueness,47
and the possession of a distinctive identity.4 8 It has been argued, for
example, that human dignity requires that persons be, and be treated as,
unique, distinct individuals with separate identities. 49 It has then been
argued that human cloning tends to undermine just the sorts of unique
individual personal identities required for human dignity.5 0 However,
as it turns out, the relations among human cloning, individual identity,
and dignity are far less clear and unequivocal.
45 Contrary to their intentions and to nearly universally shared assumptions, for example,
a particular military unit might turn out to be of "negative" value through, for example,
knowingly or unknowingly betraying the plans or the codes of the army as a whole.
46 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 7, at 657 (stating that cloning might involve "eroding the
concept of individuality which is at the core of our notions of privacy and autonomy").
47 See, e.g., Religion-Based Perspectives on Cloniig of Humans: Testimony Before National
Bioethics Advisory Commission, in 14 ETHICS & MED. 10, 12 (1998) (statement of Albert
Moraczewski); Annas, supra note 6, at 273 (noting that cloning threatens the prospect of"undermining the uniqueness of every individual on which human dignity is based");
Kaveny, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing the concern that the knowledge that one has a single
progenitor, rather than being a mix of two parents, may undercut the done child's sense of
"uniqueness"); Garcia, supra note 7, at 56 (viewing cloning as jeopardizing "human
uniqueness and dignity").
48 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 7, at 1410 ("The initial reaction to human cloning,
particularly in Europe, was that it was a violation of human dignity and identity."); Vidal,
supra note 7, at 109 (regarding having a distinctive identity: "cloning impacts directly on
this basic requirement for being a person"). For a rigorous and useful discussion of the
ambiguity of the idea of identity in this context, see also Kathinka Evers, Te Idenitity of
Clones, 24 J. MED. & PHIL. 67 (1999).
49 See supra notes 46-48.
50 See supra notes 46-48, with the exception of Evers, supra note 48.
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We must first remember that cloning can, at most, undermine
individuality or unique personal identity in only certain limited respects.
To oversimplify, 5 1 let us assume that cloning can involve the creation of
a person identical at the genetic level to another, perhaps long existing,
individual person. 5 2 Even if this is possible through cloning, we must
then consider intrauterine and other, later environmental effects, and
biological developmental processes only imperfectly controlled at the
genetic level.53 Let us simply stipulate, for the sake of advancing the
argument, that a donor and recipient clone can in some sense share an
identity, neither party being in that sense a unique individual, with
whatever effects on human dignity may flow from that.
What sort of effects on human dignity should we conclude this
to be? After all, identical twins share even an intrauterine environment
and similar cultures, yet nobody takes being an identical twin to involve
the forfeiture or the jeopardizing of human dignity in any serious
sense.5 4 We would not criminalize, or typically impose even mild moral
sanctions on, decisions that foreseeably increase the chances of having
identical twins. Dressing or otherwise treating identical twins alike is
not usually thought to destroy human dignity. Granted, most identical
twins are not intended or sought as such, whereas most clones would
presumably be deliberately cloned. But what does anyone's intention or
lack of intention to create twins or a clone have to do with whether either
a clone or an identical twin is an individual with, eventually, a
meaningfully distinct identity?
If a person knows that there is someone to whom she is
assumedly genetically identical, is not the sheer knowledge that such a
person exists, along with any real mutual interaction and ability to affect
each other, of greater relevance than whether the twinning or cloning
was intended? Let us notice as well that in many cases, the clone donor
and clone recipient will be a number of years apart in age. They may
therefore in a direct sense not even physically resemble one another at
any given time. Both the older and the younger element of the clone pair
51 See supra note 20.
52 See Evers, supra note 48.
53 See supra note 20.
54 See Robertson, supra note 7, at 1414 ("[T]he claim that human cloning necessarily
violates a person's individuality because one does not have a unique genome is not
convincing given the widespread existence of twins and the intent of a couple to gestate
and rear the resulting child.").
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may more closely resemble, along personality dimensions, persons other
than their own fellow clone.
Uniqueness itself is unlikely to be crucial to fundamental human
dignity, as the case of even unintended identical twinning suggests. And
in the case of, say, a forty year old who clones herself, we should
remember that the offspring is exactly as genetically non-unique as the
progenitor. If the resulting clone has no genetic uniqueness, neither,
logically, does the progenitor. Even if the progenitor were not
previously a clone, the progenitor herself now has exactly one other
person to whom she is assumedly genetically identical. The offspring
similarly has exactly one genetic match. If we would likely not conclude
in such a case that the forty year old progenitor previously had basic
human dignity, but has now lost it along with her genetic individuality,
so we should not conclude that the clone offspring lacks human dignity
for this reason. She is, after all, no less and no more genetically unique
than the assumed single progenitor. She may, of course, be more
vulnerable or more malleable in view of her youth and dependency.
Or consider another kind of case, admittedly entirely unrealistic,
but nevertheless illuminating. Suppose, obviously contrary to fact, that
as a matter of biological law, donating blood or donating one's kidney
had the effect of somehow altering the recipient's genetic programming
such as to become a genetic copy of the donor. The effects, though, of
different experiences and environments, and of differences in age, would
remain. Would anyone say that whatever the positive moral value of
blood or organ donation, against that must be balanced not only the
minimal loss in genetic diversity, but the loss by both donor and
recipient of their basic human dignity, given their now shared genetic
identity?
This hypothetical case illustrates the strictly limited dignitary
significance of merely genetic identity. We do not ordinarily assume that
if one twin, raised under conditions of brutal deprivation, turns out one
way, we can confidently predict that the other twin, raised under
conditions of general supportiveness, will take the same path. Even if
they did, they still might do so in recognizably distinctive ways,
indicative of one dimension of their individuality. Persons who are
genetically alike may differ in quite crucial ways.55 And, equally
55 See, e.g., Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning Through Hunan Cloning: Is There a
Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L REV. 1461, 1496-97 (1998) ("[Tlhe in-fact individuality of
the clonal child should constrain, if not eliminate, the perception of the clonal child as not
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crucially, persons who are genetically distinct may resemble one another
in crucial respects, so that we might say that they are really, deeply,
more like one another than even some identical twins.5 6 We would
certainly not see this condition as jeopardizing the basic human dignity
of either party.
An equally important response, however, is to recognize that
some of the most likely attractive forms of human cloning need not
involve even the attempted genetic duplication, insofar as possible, of
any one particular person. Even if one wishes to base one's clone on
oneself, a particular tycoon, supermodel, athlete, or actor, why not, as it
were, with a "vitamin-enhanced" genome? Why not a donor genome
purged, as far as we may become technically able, of any significant
genetically-based risks of premature physical or mental breakdown? 57
Why not, as far as possible, minimize the genetic basis in one's chosen
basic model for any serious ailment or deficiency? While we are at it,
surely the distinction between avoiding genetic deficiency and seeking
genetic enhancement will eventually become untenable in practice, if it
even makes sense in theory. Why not soup-up or enhance one's chosen
genetic model, where possible, with the genetic bases of whatever one or
one's culture, finds desirable, valuable, or marketable? Doubtless this is
a complex, occasionally frustrating and unpredictable process. What if
we start with Michael Jordan's genome and add the genetic bases for
about two more inches in height? Do we get an even better basketball
player? A worse one? A less commercially marketable player? A
marketing disappointment? No basketball player at all? Perhaps a
better basketball player three in ten times?
No doubt there will be some harsh disappointments along these
lines. No doubt there are uncertainties and sharp biological and cultural
limitations in the possibilities of even the most sophisticated future
fully individual .... No factual basis exists for viewing the clonal child as anything less
than fully individual.").
56 Cf. LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN 300 (1998) (" inhere are surely people alive today
... who are actually more similar in both looks and personality to a parent than might be
expected, on average, with a child who is a genetic clone!").
57 See Annas, supra note 6, at 267 (referring to the admittedly "futuristic" possibility that
"[An adult might have him or herself cloned, but add genes or partial gene sequences to
his or her genome to try to enhance or better the clone. The enhanced clone would then not
be genetically identical, but 'better' in terms of height, immune system intelligence, or
whatever genes could be successfully added to the cell that serves as a nucleus to the
enucleated egg.").
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genetic manipulations.58 But some sorts of such genetic enhancement
manipulations, for one reason or another, will surely be popular among
future cloners. And one practical implication of these genetic
hybridizations, or fortifications, will be clear: the primary genetic model
and the cloned offspring will, by the cloner's specific intention, be
genetically distinct, separate, non-identical persons. A genetically"enhanced" Michael Jordan clone, however successful or unsuccessful,
will certainly not be even genetically identical to Michael Jordan. In this
respect, the lack of uniqueness or individuality objection to human
cloning, and the associated threat to human dignity, will dissolve.
More deeply, though, we must ask whether uniqueness or
individuality, in any sense in which cloning might impair them, is really
necessary for human dignity. This is not to deny the romantic and other
sorts of appeal of individualism.59 Uniqueness and sheer individuality,
however, certainly do not themselves confer dignity. Each snowflake,
we may assume, is unique, but no snowflake possesses any sort of
dignity. Nor do human identical twins, or triplets, lack dignity,
regardless of whether their identicality was intended, or achieved
through technical intervention or not. As one writer has observed, "[i]t
is not individuality or identity per se that constitutes a person's dignity.
Uniqueness does not determine dignity." 60
We shall further explore the idea of dignity below.6 1 But it
should hardly surprise us, despite the influence of the tradition of
modem Western individualism,6 2 that dignity does not presuppose
genetic individualism. In at least one important sense, dignity is thought
to be something we possess not because we are each unique, but because
58 For a sense of the limitations and the historical and continuing politics, see, e.g.,
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MSMEASURE OF MAN (1996).
59 For stirring tributes to some form of individualism, see, e.g., RALPH WALDO EMERSON,
SELF-RELIANCE: AN ESSAY (1949); Henry David Thoreau, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience,
in LEGAL AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY TEXTS AND
COMMENTARY 25 (R. George Wright ed., 1992). But cf. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (propounding communitarianism).
60 Peters, supra note 7, at 22
61 See infra Parts V & V1.
62 See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
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of some widely shared yet crucial quality.63 Dignity is, at its deepest
level, as much about something we share as about something we do not
share.
Ill. DIGNITARY OBJECTIONS TO ARGUABLY FREAKISH AND HORRIFYING
SPECIAL CASES
Our talk of identical twins and human dignity may provoke a
certain impatience. Someone might sensibly concede that identical
twins, even if they were somehow intended to be identical, do not suffer
any sort of dignitary loss, but that this scenario does not begin to suggest
the potential dignitary abuses of human cloning. Even if human cloning
in the abstract is not a dignitary abuse, is not human cloning at least
subject to abuse? Do not some kinds of human cloning properly evoke
objections on dignitary grounds?
We can certainly imagine cloning scenarios ranging from the
genuinely freakish to the profoundly horrifying.64 We can, for example,
imagine conscious or non-conscious, non-mentational clones bred
merely to serve as spare bodily organ bags for predesignated
transplantation purposes. 6 5 We can imagine attempts to literally patent
human beings themselves. 66  We can imagine clones bred as a
deliberately stunted, but docile, laboring class.67 We can imagine clones
bred identically and simultaneously by the hundreds and thousands,
63 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White
Beck trans., 1959) (1785) (discussing rationality, the capacity for moral choice, autonomy,
and dignity).
64 For one widely known such scenario, consider the neo-Nazi plot fictionally elaborated
in IRA LEVIN, THE BOYS FROM BRAZIL (1995).
65 For a defense of spare-parts cloning of non-conscious, non-mentational, merely"structural" quasi-humans, see Michael Tooley, The Moral Status of the Cloning of Humans, in
HUMAN CLONING 67, 67-77 (ames M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 1998). But cf
Andrews, supra note 7, at 657 (discussing clones created merely for possible future spare
parts cannibalization); Michael A. Goldman, Hinnan Cloning: Science Fact and Fiction, 8 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 103, 115 (1998) ("The production of humans as culture vessels for spare
organs cannot be condoned.").
66 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. RESS & ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATURE?: THE SCIENCE
AND ETHICS OF HUMAN ENGINEERING 201 (1996) (raising issues of the patenting of genes,
life, or whole organisms).
67 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 7, at 1418. A bit more broadly, but classically, see
HUXLEY, supra note ". See also JONATHAN GLOVER, WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE SHOULD THERE
BE? 38 (1984) ("We imagine someone breeding a slave species combining the passive
subservience of domestic animals with some human intellectual skills.").
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raised apart from any sort of family setting or human compassion. 6 8 We
can imagine clones bred to be enslaved,6 9 perhaps with their genes
altered not only for docility, but for enhanced tolerance of pain,
radiation, pollution, or other natural harms.7 0
Doubtless the idea of reintroducing historical slavery sounds
inconceivable, even if it were somehow economically efficient.
Enslaving our genetic peers, or anyone with whom we could have
Rawlsian bargaining7 1 or a Habermasian democratic conversation 7 2 can
indeed probably be ruled out as a realistic future possibility. But what if
it turns out to be possible to breed genetically altered, stunted clones for
certain economically valuable but dangerous or for us typically
stultifying, unfulfilling tasks? What if we can breed clones who are
68 See, e.g., David M. Byers, An Absence of Love, in HUMAN CLONING: RELIGIOUS RESPONSES
66, 75 (Ronald Cole-Turner ed., 1997) ("People tend to see twins and triplets as interesting
anomalies; they might see a hundred clones as a herd."); Robertson, supra note 7, at 1418-
19; Karen H. Rothenberg, 'Being Human': Cloning and the Challenges For Public Policy, 27
HOFSTRA L. REV. 639,642 (1999).
69 See, e.g., R. Albert Mohler, Jr., The Brave New World of Cloning: A Christian Worldview
Perspective, in HUMAN CLONING: RELIGIOUS RESPONSES 91, 94 (Ronald Cole-Turner ed.,
1997) ("In an age of patented forms of life, could a cloned being be 'owned,' at least in
genetic pattern?"); Cloning Position Paper of the liT Institute For Science, Law and Technology
Working Group On Reproductive Technologies, 8 S. CAL INTERDISC. L.J. 87, 98 (1998) ("Legal
discussions of whether the replicant is the property of the cloned individual, the same
person as the cloned individual, or a resource for organs all show how easily the replicant's
own autonomy can be swept aside."); Robertson, supra note 7, at 1415 (raising the issue of
possible property status or enslavement of clones).
70 While it seems self-contradictory to intentionally genetically design a clone to entirely
freely consent to a life most of us would find unattractive, there seems no reason in
principle why clones could not be at least quite generally "steered" by being denied the
minimal genetic basis for developing certain kinds of skills. What we are utterly incapable
of doing may never develop much of a fascination for us. In this sense there may be a real
affinity between the clone's genetic programming and the tasks to which the clones
gravitate.
71 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For a more genuinely bargain-
oriented approach to justice, see DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986).
72 See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DcoURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996); JORGEN
HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS (Ciaran
Cronin trans., 1993); JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shiery Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990).
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perfectly suited for such tasks, in that they excel at just such tasks, desire
no other tasks, and are capable of performing no other tasks?73
What, in short, if there is a market for mixtures of the human
and the less than human? What if it is possible to breed only minimally
conscious humans with severely reduced cognitive capacity, on the order
of the farm animals for which we now insist at best only on minimally
pleasant living conditions? What if we can clone what amount to
minimally conscious interspecific mixtures, or, more colorfully,
economically serviceable chimeras?74 Cannot cloning allow us to
deliberately blur lines among species 75 for good or ill, and thereby blur
some important moral issues as well? 76 Just to further complicate
matters, some forms of modified clones may be intended to be born or
73 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
74 See, e.g., Annas, supra note 6, at 251 (discussing the biodesign of 'parahumans'
combining the best, or at least the most economically valuable, qualities of humans and
animals). There is obviously no reason to suppose that there will be no viable market niche
for quasi-persons substantially less capable of moral thought or broad-ranging, general
rationality than contemporary persons.
75 See, e.g., GLovER, supra note 67, at 41 ("If, instead of there being a clear gap between
monkeys and ourselves, genetic mixing resulted in many individuals varying
imperceptibly along the continuum between the two species, this might undermine our
present belief in the moral importance of the distinction. If it did, the effects might go
either way."). Thus while the genetic blending of humans and various other species might,
progressively, prompt better treatment of non-human species, we cannot rule out as well
the possibility that we might come to see human beings as less morally interesting or as
valuable as we currently do. See also REISS & STRAUGHAN, supra note 66, at 88. For a further
prospective moral line-drawing problem, see George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionimaking in
the Age of Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 93, 108-09 (1999)
(describing the feasibility of maintaining a conscious, if perhaps typically depressed,
severed or decorporated human head, with "a surprising degree of autonomy"). Id.
76 We can quickly set aside two objections to some of these scenarios. First, scientists need
not develop cognitively subhuman clones only by first creating a life form with greater
potential and then intentionally sabotaging that potential, as Aldous Huxley envisions. See
HUXLEY, supra note **. Instead, we could, if it makes any moral difference, create such a life
form from the ground up, in the sense that it never at any point had any greater cognitive
potential to sabotage. Cf. TOOLEY, supra note 65, at 70-71. Second, scientists need not locate
women who freely consent to bear any exotic or deliberately stunted form of life. Instead,
scientists will, presumably, eventually be able to develop and utilize laboratory-based
artificial wombs for such purposes if there is sufficient economic demand. See, e.g.,
Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Clotting: Is the Reach of FDA Authorihj Too Far a Stretch?, 30
SETON HALL L REV. 464, 487 n.123 (2000); Michael J. McDaniel, Note, Regulation of Human
Cloning: Implications For Biotechnological Advancement, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 543, 558 (1998).
For an expanded sense of the imaginative possibilities, see, e.g., Christine Corcos et al.,
Double-Take: A Second Look at Cloning, Science Fiction, and Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1041 (1999).
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adopted into some sort of loving, nurturing family unit, and other forms
of clones may not be so intended.
We certainly cannot respond to all of these concerns with bland
assurances. Human cloning, by itself or in conjunction with other
technologies, has in some cases the potential for the betrayal of human
dignity. The potential for misuse, however, does not establish that
human cloning in general is broadly morally objectionable. History
shows, by analogy, that institutions such as majoritarian democracy 77
and even constitutionalism 78 itself can be used to directly and severely
undermine human dignity. We should analogously distinguish among
different forms, uses, and contexts of human cloning in assessing the
relationship between cloning and human dignity. Consider again the
analogy to constitutionalism. Unless we have reason to believe that
cases at least loosely akin to Dred Scott will likely morally dominate
constitutional law, we need not conclude that constitutionalism will
generally tend to undermine human dignity. By analogy, we can and
should separately assess the dignitary status of the more and the less
benign forms of human cloning.
IV. HUMAN CLONING, INEQUALITY, AND HUMAN DIGNITY
Separating out the general phenomenon of human cloning from
some of its possible abuses hardly establishes, of course, that human
cloning itself cannot negatively affect human dignity. Our own legal and
cultural history clearly shows that at least some practices that harden
inequalities can undermine human dignity.79 Should we expect the
general practice of human cloning itself to reinforce or worsen social and
economic inequalities, thereby undermining human dignity? It is
typically assumed that human cloning will indeed tend to reinforce, if
not worsen, basic inequalities.80
77 See, e.g., Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 301, amended by Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, ch. 60,9 Stat. 462-65, repealed by Act of June 28,1864, ch. 166,13 Stat. 200.
78 See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME CouRT: THE FIRSr HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 264 (1985).
79 See, e.g., supra note 77.
80 See, e.g., GREGORY E. PENCE, WHO'S AFRAID OF HUMAN CLONING? 143-44 (1998); Eric A.
Posner & Richard A. Posner, The Demand For Human Cloning, in CLONES AND CLONES:
FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 233, 2-38 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R.
Sunstein eds., 1998) ("Cloning, ... even if cheap, would benefit mostly rich men and
women"); Id. at 258 ("Cloning may ... aggravate inequalities in genetic endowment and in
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On this point, even the thoughtful and well-recognized defender
of human cloning Professor Gregory Pence seems to assume the worst.
Pence responds to the worst case scenario which states:
[T]he rich will have better and better kids, who will be
smarter, stronger, and more beautiful, while kids of the
poor will get dumber, weaker, uglier, and carry more
genetic diseases. The poor and the politically powerless
have nothing to gain from allowing human [cloning]
and perhaps a lot to lose.81
Perhaps the essence of Professor Pence's response to this argument is
that "[a]ll that is true, but so what? Class injustice is not changed by
preventing the wealthy from buying X rather than Y; it is prevented by
not having some people . ..have wealth." 8 2 This sort of argument,
however, unnecessarily approaches a sort of combined genetic-economic
fatalism.
We should, certainly, remain alert to the possibility that the
advantages of the wealthy stem less from objectively superior genetic
endowments, and more from a broad range of environmental factors.
These factors include the present effects of earlier environmental
circumstances, along with a substantial dose of what we might call
environmental luck.8 3 However, there is no reason to suppose that
wealth...."); David Tracy, Human Cloning and the Public Reahn: A Defense of the Intuitions of
the Good, in CLONES AND CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES AeouT HUMAN CLONING 190,193
(Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998) (asking whether human cloning
would "become (as it easily could if the market decides) a new luxury item for the rich, the
beautiful, the talented, the famous?"); Annas, supra note 6, at 258 ("In the private market,
private interests prevail; those with the money can purchase services from willing
sellers."); Cahill, supra note 6, at 497 (positing that the poor and uninsured are as likely to
be excluded from many of the potential benefits of cloning technology); Shapiro, supra note
20, at 563 (discussing his more general concerns that some biotechnology may, as
commercially marketed, reinforce social stratifications to the point of irreversibility, such
that "[fnags-to-riches stories will presumably become less likely"); Lee M. Silver, Medicine's
Last Frontier: Ethics of Genetic Engineering, UNESCO COURIER, Sept. 26,1999, at 26 (fearing a
national division between an elite Genrich Stratum who have invested heavily in the
genetic design of their offspring, and the impoverished Naturals, with a diminishing class
intermarriage rate).
81 PENCE, supra note 80, at 143-44.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., INTELLIGENCE, GENES, AND SUCCESS: SCIENTISTS RESPOND TO THE BELL CURVE
(Bernie Devlin et aL eds., 1997); THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICA (Steven Fraser ed., 1995).
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Professor Pence is bound to overstate the role of genetics in accounting
for the actual class inequalities we may eventually observe. So let us
instead focus first on his argument that as long as there are relatively
rich persons, they will inevitably just buy something else if they are
legally barred from buying another thing, and that the existing class
injustice will therefore remain, even if it takes on a different form.
Pence's argument seems to go a bit too fast here. It is hard to
believe that the severity of social stratification in the long run has
nothing to do with any choices the rich make among consumer spending
and investment, or between productive and unproductive choices. Some
spending augments one's resources, other spending amounts to
dissipation. Suppose we bar the rich from having an expensive
Encyclopedia Britannica chip implanted into their child's brain. Does it
really make no long term difference in terms of social stratification if the
rich then spend the money on, say, private tutoring, or on cocaine for
themselves or their offspring? Some investments in the future economic
status of one's offspring are good human capital investments, and others
extremely bad investments, if they count as investments at all. As
writers since Plato have observed, the stability of the system of economic
stratification can be undermined when the rich choose self-indulgently to
"invest" in their own class dissipation.8 4
It is possible that if the rich were barred from investing in
cloning or other genetic technology to harden class stratifications, they
might not choose an alternative with similar effects. But we should also
reconsider the likely effects of human cloning technology on class
inequalities and human dignity. There is, crucially, no reason to suppose
that human cloning must inevitably strengthen or enhance class
inequalities. It may be, certainly, that the rich will have far more than
the poor to spend on cloning, and that cloning is the best path to
enhancing the prospects of one's offspring. But this is hardly the whole
story.
Some among the rich, doubtless, would wish to clone
themselves. But if one is rich more because one (or one's ancestor) was
lucky in some business decisions than because of any inheritable genetic
superiority, cloning one's self is unlikely to tend to freeze the current
economic strata in their place. Not all narcissistic tributes to oneself pay
off in increased advantages for one's own successor generation. Such a
84 See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 281 (Francis M. Cornford trans., 1945).
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person might instead opt for a genetically enhanced, souped up version
of him or herself, thereby conferring greater real advantage. But this
might well make the resulting clone perhaps both physically and
psychologically less like the clone's progenitor, reducing its narcissistic
appeal.
Perhaps more importantly, any sheer narcissism among the rich,
particularly those whose wealth really does reflect a distinctive, robustly
culture-insensitive 8 5 inheritable basis, may actually take on a form
cutting in favor of both sociobiological 86 narcissism and an actual
decrease in overall genetic inequality. What if, as seems likely enough,
even one or a few rich and assumedly somehow genetically advantaged
persons decide to subsidize their own cloning, to the special benefit of
the poor? In a postmodernist variation of the examples of Johnny
Appleseed with regard to apples, 87 Andrew Carnegie with regard to
public libraries, 88 and Bill Gates with regard to computers and computer
programs, 89 one could donate one's own presumed genetic excellence,
perhaps fortified with genetic enhancements, to anyone willing to raise
the resulting child.
Only one or a few such donors would be necessary to provide a
presumed genetic boost to thousands, if not millions, of economically
distressed recipients. Some combination of public spiritedness, curiosity,
deep sociobiological impulse, frivolity, and sheer egomania could be
counted upon to supply at least a few subsidizing donors. Of course,
this sort of genetic supermarket might not be popular with potential
child-bearing recipients. Consumer misperceptions, if not outright false
advertising, may be both present and legally regulable in any market.
But the thought of bearing an enhanced or unenhanced clone of someone
one genuinely admires may in some cases seem more appealing than the
best realistic alternative, no less among the poor than among others.
85 It seems possible that a gene or set of genes that, we shall casually assume, triggered
economic success in a given culture, at a given time, under given circumstances, might well
not trigger economic success perhaps forty years later, in an inevitably different time and
culture. A successful basic attitude toward risk in the year 1960 may well not be equally
successful in one's cloned offspring in the year 2000.
86 See EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOL.GY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (2000).
87 See, e.g., VACHEL LINDSAY, JOHNNY APPLESEED AND OTHER POEMS (1961).
88 See, e.g., ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ANDREW CARNEGIE (1986).
89 See, e.g., Beverly Goldberg, Gates Gives Chicago PL Million-Dollar Connection, AM. LIB.,
May 1996, at 19.
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One can even imagine bidding wars among a few eager donors,
resulting in reduced costs and increased convenience for those willing to
enhance a particular donor's circulation count. We can, in any event,
certainly imagine this sort of charity on a scale sufficient to undercut the
widespread belief that cloning will tend to enhance genetic class
inequalities.90 Human dignity, in any event, is not seriously threatened
by the combined egalitarian and inegalitarian effects of human
cloning.91
V. A KANTIAN APPROACH TO DIGNITY AND HUMAN CLONING
If we are to understand why cloning, in itself, does not generally
threaten, and may in fact heighten, the appeal of human dignity, we
must think a bit more about the nature of human dignity. There are a
number of influential approaches to this idea,92 but it is widely held that
Immanuel Kant in particular has written suggestively and powerfully on
the subject. Kant holds that "rational beings are designated 'persons'
because their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves, i.e.,
things which may not be used merely as a means." 93 Kant famously
urges: "[aict so that you treat humanity, whether in your person or in
that of another, always as an end and never as a means only."94 Kant
explicitly connects this moral status as an end to the idea of dignity in
this way: "that which constitutes the condition under which alone
something can be an end in itself does not have mere relative worth, i.e.,
a price, but an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity."95
90 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
91 It is possible, however, that the chief harm of this sort of Johnny Appleseed
phenomenon could be a dangerous or at least costly reduction in overall human genetic
diversity. Genetic diversity is, for various reasons, a good thing. See, e.g., L.M. COOK &
R.S. CALLOW, GENETIC AND EVOLUTIONARY DIVERSITY: THE SPORT OF NATURE (1999). We
shall, however, confidently assume that despite the vast and intense influence of the most
popular celebrity fads, general restlessness and boredom with even the most currently
popular genetic donors will lead, if only unintendedly, to genetic diversification through
the embrace of new genetic models.
92 See, e.g., GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN (A.
Robert Caponigri trans., 1956).
93 KANT, supra note 63, at 46.
94 Id. at 47. For discussion, see, e.g., MARCIA W. BARON, KANTIAN ETHICS ALMOST
WITHOUT APOLOGY 47 (1999).
95 KANT, supra note 63, at 53 (emphasis in the original). See also ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE
AUTONOMY OF REASON 186 (1973). Dignity is infinitely beyond price; to try to
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Dignity itself of course does not exist freestandingly. Kant urges
that "morality and humanity, so far as it is capable of morality, alone
have dignity."9 6 Morality in turn, or more precisely the capacity for
morality, requires the capacity for the free and rational act of consistent
universal moral self-legislation that Kant refers to as autonomy.9 7 While
it is dignity that confers this elemental moral worth, dignity is thus
dependent upon the variety of elements that go to make up an actor's
autonomy.
While not offering a full clarification of Kantian dignity and
autonomy, commentators offer some useful insight into them. Allen
Wood simultaneously clarifies matters a bit, while raising intriguing
questions, in observing that for Kant:
[Bleing an end in itself cannot come in degrees... Kant's
position therefore has to be that anything having the
capacity to set ends and act according to reason is an
end in itself, however well or badly it may exercise the
capacity. It is a separate question (perhaps a much
harder one to answer) how the requirement applies to
beings in which humanity is found only to an uncertain
degree. The one option not open to Kant is to allow
gradations of human dignity or differences in rank
among members of the realm of ends.9 8
commensurate the two is to violate the sanctity of dignity itself. See BARBARA HERMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 125 (1993); H.J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
189 (Pennsylvania Paperback ed., 1971) (1947).
96 KANT, supra note 63, at 53.
97 See id. at 54. Kant explicates the idea of autonomy, with its emphasis on freedom,
generativity, independence, consistency, rationality, and universality. See id. at 51. See also,
e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 108 (1988) (stating that
autonomy is the ability to reflect upon and alter one's motivational structure); THOMAS E.
HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANTS MORAL THEORY 87 (1992) (defining
autonomy as involving rationality as well as "negative" and "positive" freedom);
CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 24 (1996) (discussing Kant's
linkages among rationality, freedom, and morality).
98 ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 121 (1999) (emphasis in the original).
Professor Wood emphasizes that Kant's focus here is not precisely on the diversely
ambiguous idea of "humanity," but on "personality" as the locus of dignity, where"personality" refers specifically not to rational nature in general, but to (any) rational
nature with the capacity for moral self-legislation. See id. at 115.
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As Professor Roger Sullivan elaborates the remaining uncertainties,
"Kant unfortunately does not discuss how we are to go about identifying
who bears a moral personality... He does say that the only beings we
in fact know have the status of persons are human beings." 9 9 And
Kant's own argument commits him to something like the view that "we
cannot reasonably deny dignity to any human being," or presumably to
any other sort of being, "who is the sort of'(minimally) rational agent we
take ourselves to be."1 0 0 The morally decisive consideration is the
capacity for this sort of minimally rational law-giving, not the number or
configuration of our chromosomes, and certainly not whether we share
too many genes with one or more specified persons.
Professor Onora O'Neill at this point usefully distinguishes free
and rational agents from mere things, props, or implements incapable of
agency. 1 0 1 As imperfect as we may take our freedom and rationality in
moral thinking to be, we can certainly generally endorse this distinction.
We may attach moral blame to a person's recklessness in not bothering
to inspect a reported hazardous wiring problem, and we would certainly
not assign any moral blame or responsibility to the actual short circuit
itself involved in the resulting fire. If we set aside the more exotic forms
of cloning, in which of these categories, then, of persons or things, would
we place "garden variety" genetically enhanced or unenhanced clones?
Are such adult clones capable of adopting either a reckless or a
conscientious attitude toward dangerous wiring? Or are such adult
clones really more like the merely mechanical defective circuit itself?
The proper Kantian categorization seems clear.
We have seen that there may be close dignitary cases even
among non-cloned human beings.1 02 But there is certainly nothing in
Kant to suggest that "normal" adult clones, appropriately raised, will
lack the minimum combinations of the capacities for reason, moral
99 ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 199 (1989).
100 THOMAS E. HILu, JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-REsPECT 172 (1991).
101 See ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS IN KANT'S PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 138 (1989). O'Neill does recognize the possibility of problematic intermediate
cases, such as infants, non-human animals, the senile, and the comatose. See id. at 138 n.11.
For an extended treatment of the admittedly complex ideas of freedom and autonomy in
Kant, see HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM 98 (1990) (discussing autonomy
as "the capacity to be moved to action by a rule of action... that makes no reference to an
agent's needs or interests as a sensuous being"). There is, of course, a sense in which any
sensible moral rule must take the needs or interests of embodied beings into account.
102 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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choice, freedom, generativity, consistency, independence, and
universality with which non-cloned human adults typically credit
themselves. Jointly, these qualities generate a degree of autonomy 103
sufficient to bring such clones over the threshold of dignity.104
Suppose we start with, let us say, two law professors on opposite
sides of the globe. Let us try to determine, separately, whether they each
possess the minimum degree of autonomy and other qualities necessary
to qualify for Kantian dignity. We could, presumably, conclude that we
cannot tell whether they are crucially different from mere objects, and
that we cannot know whether they possess any degree of freedom or
autonomy. Now, this is a sensible conclusion, to which many modem
reductionists might subscribe. But it is hardly confinable to a conclusion
only about law professors. Inevitably, if these two law professors are
incapable of autonomy, and therefore of human dignity, so, probably, is
nearly everyone else, clone or non-clone. The headline story would
surely not be that clones lack human dignity, but that nearly everyone
does. How welcome this result should be must be reserved for another
occasion. 105
But if we remain willing to attribute autonomy and hence
dignity to the two law professors, will we then change our minds if we
learn that, unknown to the two law professors, one is a clone of the
other? Or that they are both clone offspring of a third party? Does this
make any relevant difference? What if we then delicately break the news
of their cloneship, without conveying any more information about their
progenitor? Does that revelation necessarily cause their autonomy and
dignity to shatter irreparably? What if we then arrange a meeting
among all relevant parties? Must there at that point be a destruction of
autonomy and dignity, reducing at least one party to the moral status of
an elaborate piece of machinery?
But what if, say, in a more extreme case, an overbearing,
egomaniacal, neurotic parent, frustrated by a childhood tennis injury,
clones a child and compels the cloned offspring to devote herself
exclusively to tennis? Perhaps in the most extreme case, the clone's will
may be so broken or deformed as to not be capable of the degree of
103 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104 See id.
105 For a start, see R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Hunan
Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397 (1995).
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autonomy minimally necessary for Kantian dignity. But even this
extreme case merely amplifies our experiences with the worst cases of
tennis parenting of non-cloned children.10 6 Certainly, some naive
parents of cloned children may expect too much precisely in virtue of
their child's cloned status. Some parents may believe that, for example,
Michael Jordan clones should play basketball as well and as lucratively
as Michael Jordan. Disappointment, however, is inevitable. Time and
bitter experience should eventually temper such expectations. A Michael
Jordan professional and commercial career is hardly the inevitable result
of the infusion of the Michael Jordan genome. 1 0 7
Many parents may not be able to recite, in technical terms, the
reasons why genetics is not destiny. But as collective experience
gradually accumulates, a parental-cultural-folk wisdom will emerge that
will dampen down or prevent unreasonable expectations, and thereby at
least some of the most destructive regimentation and browbeating of
clone children. Various reasons to clone may still exist, and parental
hopes may be both high and realistic in certain limited respects, but there
will eventually arise a folk maxim roughly along the lines of "you can
lead a clone to water, but you cannot make her drink."
We should thus expect ordinary human clones to be generally
capable of the elements of Kantian dignity. Let us illustrate the point
more generally. Suppose we think that an apparently ordinary person
"A" possesses the requisites of human dignity. And then we encounter
person "B" who has the same genome as A, or as close as cloning will
permit, because B is in fact a clone of A. We may understandably say,
with all the complications added in,1 0 8 that the clone offspring B is, if
not genetically identical to the clone progenitor A, at least unusually
genetically similar to the progenitor A. Their environments and
experiences, uterine and post-uterine, may have varied either relatively
little, or else quite dramatically, given any differences of culture, family
upraising, and of history itself.1 9
106 In the most extreme cases, these effects may be approached by the most driven tennis
parents.
107 For some of the reasons, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
109 In an extreme case, presumably, a clone offspring could, through sophisticated
technology, be born after the death of the progenitor, or even hundreds of years later.
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In all such cases, it would be curious, if not paradoxical, to say
that person A and person B are genetically quite similar, roughly akin to
the way identical twins or triplets would be,110 and that this genetic
similarity, perhaps if it is known to A and B, is itself sufficient to trigger
the remarkable result that at least one of the persons A or B, despite their
differences, cannot be a Kantian person, and must lack autonomy,
resulting in the absence of human dignity and their degradation to the
status of a mere object. This sounds realistically possible, however, in
only the most extreme, pathological kind of case. Whatever the social
and psychological difficulties of being an identical twin,111 we do not
typically expect such persons to occupy the same dignitary status as
extremely complex toasters. Human clones certainly can, and typically
will, fare generally well on dignitary grounds, especially those clones
that are cared for and created for relatively benign reasons. 112
110 Presumably, identical twins shared a relatively similar uterine environment, early
nutritional influences, and early child raising practices, at the same time in the same
broader culture. Presumably, most clones will not share all of these similarities to the same
degree.
111 Of course, historically it has been true that most parents of identical twins have not
intended to have identical twins, although this may be subject to cultural and technological
changes. In contrast, those involved in a human cloning process of any sort, for any reason,
will know and presumably intend, in some sense, that a clone be the resulting offspring.
But there will doubtless be more than one reason for seeking a cloned offspring, and not all
of those reasons are linked to any intent to browbeat the resulting done in such a way as to
jeopardize the clone's autonomy and Kantian dignity. As merely one possibility, cloning a
beloved and evidently genetically healthy grandparent seems to pose little risk of
autonomy destruction.
112. See supra note 111. For apparently opposing views, compare Andrews, supra note 7, at
668 ("Intentionally producing people whose genetic predispositions are known
undermines their free will.") with Dorff, supra note 37, at 120 ("Cloning, of course, will, if it
is ever effected, produce independent human beings with histories and influences all their
own and with their own free will."). Professor Andrews' approach does seem to involve
something of an overstatement. Everyone has many genetic predispositions, of varying
strengths, and often, we as observers know the most currently relevant such
predispositions. But this common state of affairs hardly implies that we can, let alone
already have, destroyed the relevant person's free will in the relevant respect. For some
general theoretical background, see, e.g., Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and
Moral Responsibility, in MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY 143 (ohn Martin Fischer ed., 1986); Harry G.
Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in ESSAYS ONFREEDOM OF AcION 65 (Ted
Honderich ed., 1973); Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in
MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY 65 (John Martin Fischer ed., 1986); Harry G. Frankfurt, Three
Concepts of Free Action, in MORAL RESPONSIBILTY 113 Uohn Martin Fischer ed., 1986).
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VI. THE HUMAN CLONING PROCESS AS HEIGHTENING OUR APPRECIATION
FOR THE BASES OF HUMAN DIGNITY
In some sense, actual human cloning would illustrate the broad
scope of our ability to deeply control human lives. But it is equally
important that we also recognize a different lesson: the dramatic
technical manipulations of human cloning will often have surprisingly
little effect on human autonomy and human dignity, largely because
autonomy and dignity, and their foundations, are and will remain for us
a profound and unassimilable mystery. Human cloning may well serve
to highlight, to emphasize, and to set off with greater clarity, quite apart
from anyone's intentions, the mysterious capacities that comprise and
express our human dignity.
Human beings, after all, will have dignity only to the extent that
they are more than the sum of their electrochemical or merely biological
parts. We will not possess human dignity if we are reducible to any sort
of biological machine, even a highly sophisticated, internally regulated,
self-sustaining, genetically-based machine. Instead, we will have human
dignity if our highest human capacities, such as making moral
judgments and moral choices, are central to what it means to be human
and yet remain in a sense deeply unexplainable.
The ironic, unintended effect of human cloning in general is
actually to illustrate the profound mystery of what is most crucial to
humanity by promoting the demystifying, disenchanting, and technical
controlling of nearly everything else about us, so that the grounds of
human dignity shine out in stark relief, by way of contrast. Through the
actual practice of human cloning, human dignity will be alive and well,
in the mysterious realms of consciousness, self-consciousness, free will,
moral and other reasoning, and autonomy; even when the genome itself,
the physical body and its appearance, and even the possibility of genetic
uniqueness and individuality are largely dictated by some controlling
agency. By a sort of loose analogy, we learn more about and better
appreciate the real nature of magnetism when we discover that we
cannot negate magnetism by, let us say, holding a paper between the
magnet and its object. It is only when all that might be confused with
the sources of human dignity is alienated or stripped away that the real
sources of human dignity become most clearly apparent.
Human cloning, presumably, can illustrate our ability to
productively manipulate the human genome. If the genome and its
mechanical expression were all there were to the human person, the
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human person would lack dignity. But it is our very ability to
conscientiously choose to manipulate the human genome that itself
suggests how we transcend the human genome in profound and
inevitably mysterious ways.
Let us build toward the autonomy that Kant sees as constitutive
of dignity, or of inner worth beyond price.1 1 3 Let us begin with the
utter, and the utterly central, mystery of consciousness itself. David
Chalmers has written that:
Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing
in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing
we know about more directly than consciousness, but it
is far from clear how to reconcile it with everything else
we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How
could it possibly arise from lumpy gray matter? We
know consciousness far more intimately than we know
the rest of the world, but we understand the rest of the
world far better than we understand consciousness. 1 1 4
Even those who are relatively optimistic concede that
"[c]onsciousness stands alone today as a topic that often leaves even the
most sophisticated thinkers tongue-tied and confused." 1 1 5 Others
recognize that one's "'own' consciousness, the most obvious thing there
is, may be forever beyond our conceptual grasp."1 1 6 Still others
conclude more decisively that "the bond between the mind and the brain
is a deep mystery. Moreover, it is an ultimate mystery, a mystery that
113 See, e.g., KANT, supra note 63, at 51.
114 DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY 3
(1996). Chalmers goes on to observe that:
[Clonsciousness is surprisin. If all we knew about were the facts of
physics, and even the facts about dynamics and information
processing in complex systems, there would be no compelling reason
to postulate the existence of conscious experience. If it were not for
our direct evidence in the first-person case, the hypothesis would seem
unwarranted; almost mystical, perhaps.
Id. at 5 (emphasis in the original).
115 DENNETT, supra note 44, at 22.
116 Steven Pinker, Silicon Souls, SUNDAY TIMES-LoNDoN, Jan. 31, 1999, at 4, available at 1999
WL 7901308.
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human intelligence will never unravel."1 1 7 It is not as though we have
made at least irregular, halting, occasionally retrogressive, intermittent
progress toward understanding human consciousness. "We do not just
lack a detailed theory; we are entirely in the dark about how
consciousness could fit into the natural order."1 1 8 To put it another
way, it is baffling how we could commensurate the objective and the
subjective; "the rich phenomenology of the conscious stream and
complex neural phenomena appear to belong to two different
orders." 11 9
There are certainly some senses in which we can explain, or
explain away, the activity of consciousness. These can involve progress
in genuinely productive fields of scientific inquiry, without explaining
consciousness in the sense in which we are interested. We can thus at
least claim that consciousness confers evolutionary survival value,1 2 0
that it is analogous in some way to a sophisticated model of information
processing,1 2 1 that it is an "emergent property" of complex brain
functioning,1 2 2 or even that consciousness is properly axiomatic and
therefore simply not subject to scientific explanation.123
117 COLIN MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD 5
(1999).
118 CHALMERS, supra note 114, at Xl. See also MICHAEL LOCKWOOD, MIND, BRAIN, AND THE
QUANTUM 1 (1989).
119 OWEN FLANAGAN, CONSCIOUSNESS RECONSIDERED XI (1992).
120 See, e.g., JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 107 (1992) (explaining
consciousness as enhancing discriminatory powers). But see GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM
AND BELIEF 156 (1986) (discussing non-conscious, including nearly random behavior under
appropriate circumstances, as making detection, etc. by a predator more difficult).
Whether consciousness actually confers survival value or not is really irrelevant to our
point. Explanation in terms of survival value does not really begin to provide an
explanation of how a mechanism or process actually arises or operates. We could, for
example, account for the persistence of a new ability to teleport objects or naturally
generate personal protective force fields through their presumed survival value. But this
explanation would not begin to dissolve any mystery as to how we actually go about doing
these things.
121 See ANTHONY KENNY, THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND 107 (1992) ("[Hlumans are-always
inclined to explain things we only imperfectly understand in terms of the most advanced
technology of the age we live in."). But cf. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 16
(1986) ("[Clurrent attempts to understand the mind by analogy with man-made computers
... will be recognized as a gigantic waste of time.").
122 See, e.g., JOHN R. SEARLE, THE MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 18 (1997) (explaining
consciousness as an emergent property of, and as causally explained, in some fashion, by
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Consciousness is but a component, however, of the perhaps even
more profound mystery of autonomy, as mediated by self-consciousness.
For autonomy to arise, it would seem that consciousness in general must
in some part take on the form of a consciousness of our own subjective
inner life. 1 24 Genuine self-consciousness must be reflected in our
consciousness of the fact that some of what we are consciously aware of
is in fact ourself.1 2 5 And genuine self-consciousness may be central to
our very identity and to our further mysterious capacity to act
autonomously, or as morally free and responsible rationally deliberative
agents.1 2 6
The mystery of freedom of the will, and of Kantian rational
autonomy, is at the heart of the deepest sort of human dignity we would
wish to protect. Freedom and autonomy, as bases of Kantian dignity,1 2 7
are crucial to moral and dignitary value. As Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola argues, our freedom of the will allows us in a sense to
transcend the externally imposed initial limitations of our nature.1 2 8 We
can thus in a sense shape even our own nature and capacities. 1 2 9
The capacity to freely initiate chains of reasoned thought has
long been recognized as of enormous dignitary value. Aristotle, for
example, refers to contemplation and intuitive reason as literally, and not
merely figuratively, a divine element within all competent persons.1 30
Augustine develops a similar dignitary theme in arguing that "the soul
of a beast is nobler than that ... which only exists without living or
understanding. [Tihat which includes existence, life, and understanding,
the brain). Talk of consciousness as an emergent property, however, comes perilously dose
to merely restating the mystery of consciousness, if in a somewhat stylized way.
123 See, e.g., David J. Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness June 1999)
available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/-chalmers/papers/facing.html (taking
consciousness itself to be fundamental). We should, however, resist the obvious
temptation to bury our deepest, most mysterious, genuine problems by converting them
into axiomatic, basic assumptions not susceptible of inquiry.
124 See, e.g., LOCKWOOD, supra note 118, at 1.
125 See, e.g., STRAWSON, supra note 120, at 146-47.
126 See id. at 147.
127 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
128 See MIRANDOLA, supra note 92, at 7.
129 See id.
130 See ARISrOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHics 330-31 U.A.K. Thomson trans., (1976); J.O.
URMSON, AR SrcLE's ETmIcs 122 (1988).
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such as the rational mind of man, is nobler still." 1 3 1 Augustine is in turn
echoed by Thomas Aquinas,1 3 2 and then by great humanists such as
Pascal.1 3 3
No one can doubt the sheer manipulative power of future
human cloning techniques. In some cases, that genetically-based power
will be reinforced by clear and specific parental expectations, and by
close resemblances in appearance between clone and progenitor, at least
at the same age. In some respects, even the individuality of the resulting
clone or clones could certainly be questioned.1 3 4
But it is equally clear that the genetic tinkering-even the
profound genetic tinkering that cloning in a sense involves-will in its
typical instances leave unimpaired the resulting clone's human dignity.
Cloning will leave human dignity unimpaired in every case in which it
leaves the bases or constituent elements of human dignity, such as the
minimally sufficient capacity for rational autonomy, unimpaired. 13 5
Human cloning, in its most typical manifestations, should thus at a
minimum pose no threat to human dignity.
In fact, human cloning and its associated technical machinations
should typically, if quite inadvertently, operate to clarify the nature of
human dignity and to heighten our awareness of and appreciation for
human dignity. Just as intense heat may serve to purify a metal, so
human cloning may clarify what is really essential to human dignity, and
what things--including a unique genetic identity-are not. Once the
dross of genetic uniqueness and of difference in appearance is largely, if
not entirely, burned away, we are left with something more nearly
approaching the mystery of human dignity itself.
Now, we may assume that it is possible to do injury to a future
clone in the very act of cloning itself,1 36 even if we continue to set aside
131 ST. AUGUSTINE, THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK II, § 6.13, at 91 (Dom Mark
Pontifex trans., 1955).
132 See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLrrICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 178-80 (1998).
133 See PASCAL, PENS9ES 125 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., 1966).
134 See supra Part 1I.D.
135 See, e.g., Dorff, supra note 37, at 120.
136 We shall here simply assume that it is possible to do moral wrong to, and even to
impair the dignity of, a clone who has not yet been conceived or created, and whose very
identity will be created, and not merely altered, by the wrongful act itself. For discussion
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all the freakish and horrifying forms of cloning and subsequent social
practices that clearly can impair human dignity. 137 If, for example, we
choose to combine commercially subsidized cloning and genetic
engineering in such a way that a child is born with the prominent
corporate logos of her corporate sponsors as unremovable birthmarks,
we are faced with a genuine moral problem.138 We cannot neatly
sidestep the problem by correctly pointing out that if the subsidizing
corporate logos had not been provided for, she herself might never have
been born. Either no one would have been born in her stead, or else
someone whose identity is clearly different from that of the person
actually born would have resulted, so that the person actually born has
no grounds for complaint.
We cannot simply evade the problem of the corporate "billboard
clone." Being a necessary cause of someone's very existence and identity
does not give us a license to humiliate that person. No one should be
forced to choose between never having been born, and thus having no
identity at all in the first place, and existence as an involuntary human
corporate billboard. It is objectionable to require the billboard clone to
choose between just that status and not being around at all.139
And on the merits, it is contrary to the dignity of the resulting
clone to design her as a corporate billboard. It would also be contrary to
dignity to design a clone to be unsteady on her feet, for the sake of
general amusement in her frequent falls. It would be, as we have
suggested, contrary to human dignity to require a clone child to devote
herself obsessively to basketball, to the exclusion of all other possible
interests and pursuits. And it would be contrary to human dignity to
clone a child just for the experimental interest in seeing how she copes
of whether this sort of pre-conceptual, pre-identity harm is even possible, see, e.g., DEREK
PARFrr, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-79 (1984); Michael Bayles, Hann to the Unconceived, 5
PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 292, 297-98 (1976); Gregory S. Kavka, Tie Paradox of Future Individuals, 11
PHIL & PuB. AFF. 93 (1982); Derek Parfit, Future Generations: Further Problems, 11 PHIL. &
PuB. AFF. 113 (1982).
137 For example, the hypothetical minimal-brain cases discussed supra Part Ill.
138 Ideally, of course, it would be possible to combine cloning and commercially
subsidized genetic engineering in such a way that the resulting clone had a predictable
quite genuine preference for all of her corporate sponsors' products, as opposed to those of
their competitors.
139 Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 597 (1985) (overruling the
requirement to take the "bitter" along with the "sweet" of an employment guarantee in
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
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with being remarkably unattractive, with being psychologically
abandoned, or with closely resembling some easily recognizable,
notorious person.
This list of ways in which human cloning could, quite apart from
the most horrifying scenarios referred to above,14 0 involve dignitary
abuses could obviously be lengthened. Plainly, we cannot claim that the
human cloning process cannot possibly be used, intentionally or
unintentionally, against human dignity. But the same might be said
about all sorts of generally worthy activities, including, almost at
random, the process of using paint and a paintbrush. Human cloning in
itself is no more inimical to human dignity than the process of painting.
It is proper to regulate painting through some combination of law,
custom, and morality. Generally, it is an offense against dignity to
permanently paint unconsenting people as they sleep. Painting certain
verbal messages on people, or on the walls of their home, may also be an
offense against dignity. Similarly, it will doubtless be proper to regulate
even the more benign forms of human cloning through some
combination of law, custom, and morality.
One way to reassure ourselves on this score is to notice that, at
least in the non-horrific human cloning scenarios, we are really
concerned about dignity in two distinct senses. One sense is the more
relatively superficial, and is often more largely cultural in nature. It is in
this sense that unknowingly wearing a "Kick Me" sign or, more cruelly
and severely, being cloned to be amusing in appearance, violate human
dignity. Often, cloning indignities in this sense really have nothing to do
with cloning itself, in that they could be perpetrated, at least in theory,
by other means, as perhaps by cosmetic surgery.
The crucial point to remember, though, is that while the more
superficial sorts of cloning indignities may violate human dignity in a
morally significant way, they do not touch human dignity in the more
profound and ultimately crucial Kantian sense explored above.141
Dignity in this fundamental, utterly mysterious, ultimately valuable
sense remains intact and untouched by these relatively superficial sorts
of abuses of human cloning. Ultimately, it is from the continuing
presence of this deeper, more fundamental sense of human dignity that
ordinary insults, humiliations, or similar sorts of dignitary violations
140 See supra Part Ill.
141 See supra Part V.
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derive their wrongness. The most common forms of human cloning
leave human dignity in this more fundamental sense directly unaffected,
and, as we have seen, indirectly heightened.
